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On the surface, King v. Burwell appears to be a simple case about 
statutory interpretation. In the Affordable Care Act (widely known as 
Obamacare),1 when Congress referred to the “State,” in the provision 
triggering federal subsidies to insurance consumers for purchases made 
from federally-authorized insurance providers selling federally-
authorized insurance products, should the “State” be understood to refer 
to the federal market (i.e., exchanges) as well as “State” markets.2 
Simple tools of statutory construction—namely, that Congress knew full 
well how to refer to a “federal” exchange and failed to do so—would 
seem to be sufficient to supply a result.3 
It would also seem be a stretch to rely on legislative history to 
overturn this conclusion. Some, such as Steven Brill, who has recently 
delivered an otherwise masterful account of the origins of Obamacare,4 
might describe the critical language in this case as a “drafting error” 
committed when Senate Legislative Counsel, at the last minute, needed 
to revise the Senate bill that ultimately became law for a purely partisan 
final vote and without significant debate. But even Brill acknowledges 
that “drafting errors” of this kind would ordinarily have been corrected 
by “routine” procedures to make technical amendments, and that such 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of 
America; J.D., Columbia Law School, A.B. Harvard College. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
2 Id. at § 1311(b, d). 
3 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 56-58, 107-111 (2012) (discussing the textual 
supremacy and negative implication canons). 
4 See STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, 
AND THE FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 194 (2015) [hereinafter 
AMERICA’S BITTER PILL]. 
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“technical” corrections were never made.5 It turns out that, as Brill 
himself concedes, it was Senate staffers responsible for the bill—
although, notably, no named Senators—who “always intended” that the 
federal exchange would serve as a backup to the states “that could not or 
would not mount their own exchanges so that people in those states could 
get the full benefit of Obamacare,” presumably including the subsidies 
available to consumers on the “State” Exchanges.6 Yet, as Brill 
recognizes, the Senate bill that became the basis for the final law was 
proposed only two months before final enactment; and it was the Senate 
bill that, for the first time, changed the proposal to provide for insurance 
exchanges in each of the states, superseding the House’s proposal for a 
single, federal exchange.7 In short, the late-in-the-day shift to a statutory 
scheme employing a primarily state-managed programs at the very least 
diminishes the significance of what congressional staff, and perhaps even 
members of Congress, “always” intended. Finally, for reasons made clear 
in an amicus brief I joined, co-authored by my colleagues Bob Destro 
and Marshall Breger, the overall statutory scheme, in the context of 
background considerations of tax and administrative law, commands an 
interpretation that accords with the plain language of the statute.8 
Congress created a system that would support State-created Exchanges 
rather than a scheme that would lead ineluctably to a primarily federal 
system. 
But here I want to take the opportunity to argue that text and its 
context supply only a part of the answer the Court must give in King v. 
Burwell. Federalism principles that serve as postulates in our 
constitutional structure and traditions are also implicated, and even more 
so in a legislative scheme authored by the Senate, which continues to 
serve as the primary guarantor in the federal portion of our government 
of state authority and autonomy. Substantively, U.S. federalism 
principles require a different approach to health care than simply 
following the nominally more efficient models, usually single-payer 
systems employed in the rest of the industrialized world; and, if 
                                                                                                             
5 Id. 
6 Id. (“[S]omeone had mistakenly cut and pasted language from a provision in an 
earlier draft that referred only to state exchanges and used it in one place, though not 
elsewhere, as a boilerplate reference to the exchanges in one of the clauses describing 
how the subsidies would work.”). 
7 Id. at 174. For convoluted reasons that go well beyond the scope of this essay, 
Senator Reid’s proposal became the legislative vehicle that in time became Obamacare. 
For the connection between this legislative process and the crony capitalism that 
characterized the enactment and implementation of the bill, see infra text accompanying 
notes 36-51. 
8 See generally Brief for Administrative & Constitutional Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (2014) (No. 14-114). 
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Obamacare’s federal exchange becomes the vehicle for the ultimate 
realization of federal supremacy, and perhaps eventually a European-
style, single-payer model—thereby marginalizing the states and private 
sector—Obamacare will achieve a radical change in the federal-state 
balance without the consensual process our political system has always 
required. 
In brief, we need to accept that our national political system, unlike 
those found elsewhere, may never be as efficient, and certainly not as 
centralized, as the proponents of harmonization with the rest of the world 
would hope. Rather than adopt the single-goal, universal vehicle of a 
federal solution, the values that underlay American federalism force us to 
compromise and balance, at least to some extent, multiple values; our 
federalism serves not only efficiency but also liberty (through 
transparency and democratic accountability) and pluralism (through 
allowing divergent local communities to fashion policies that reflect their 
different interests). In fact, federalism’s decentralizing and democracy-
reinforcing legacy to the U.S. is precisely the cure for the diseases in our 
political system that produced a legislative process infected with the 
crony capitalism Steven Brill so richly describes and may in due course 
produce even more efficient results. Thus, in the broader context of our 
constitutional structure and traditions, the Court should read the text to 
enable the states and the people to be the primary agents for finishing the 
job of reforming health care in the United States. Only state and citizen 
participation in a consensual process that is transparent, deliberative and 
accountable can correct the crony capitalism that birthed this legislative 
monstrosity. 
This essay briefly outlines the federalism postulates that necessarily 
inform the Supreme Court’s task in King v. Burwell. It then explains how 
multi-value federalism’s insights should inform the Court’s 
understanding of how Obamacare was enacted, how it should be 
interpreted and why the Supreme Court’s decision matters, not only for 
the construction of a better and more sustainable national consensus on 
health care but also for preventing the decay of our political system into 
a kleptocracy serving the needs of elites and insiders rather than the 
common good. 
THE MANY FACES OF U.S. FEDERALISM 
Any discussion of American federalism needs to begin with James 
Madison, who in Federalist No. 51 observed: 
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the 
people is submitted to the administration of a single 
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government; and the usurpations are guarded against by 
a division of the government into distinct and separate 
departments. In the compound republic of America, the 
power surrendered by the people is first divided between 
two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted 
to each subdivided among the distinct and separate 
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights 
of the people. The different governments will control 
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled 
by itself.9 
This “double security” reinforces the central Madisonian idea that 
“ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”10 Madison’s 
appreciation of human nature entailed the view that, for man, “[a]s long 
as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his 
opinions and his passions will have reciprocal influence on each other; 
and the former will be the object to which the latter will attach 
themselves.”11 It would follow, in other words, even assuming the purist 
of motives, that “passions,” including a passion for apparent altruism, 
that will infect our reason can deceive us to believe that our self-interest 
is altruistic. Madison’s theory of political psychology is as relevant today 
as it was at the Founding. 
Yet, in Madison’s day, the greatest threat to liberty in the United 
States was the potential for local tyranny in the states, where “factions” 
could capture political processes and divert public resources from the 
common good to private benefit—thus, his strategy of “enlarging” the 
sphere of public action to reduce the incidence of capture by majority 
factions.12 In his warning against the danger of the capture of 
government by elite groups preserving and expanding their monopoly 
privileges through clandestine means, Madison reflected the experience 
of legislative tyrannies in the pre-Constitutional governments of the 
States.13 More importantly, he reflected the universal sentiment in the 
Colonies that political “corruption” in Parliament had resulted in policies 
                                                                                                             
9 THE FEDERALIST, NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) [THE 
FEDERALIST]. 
10 Id. at 319. 
11 THE FEDERALIST, NO. 10, at 73 (James Madison). 
12 See id. at 75. 
13 See generally GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87 
(1969) (describing the initial tendency of states in the 1780s in order to prevent executive 
tyranny to adopt constitutions providing for legislative supremacy, the factional and 
sometimes tyrannical legislatively-dominated state governments that followed, and the 
consequent increasing popular support throughout the states for separation and balancing 
of powers as a preferred mode of constitutional design). 
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that deprived the colonists of their rights as members of the British 
Empire.14 But, unlike in Madison’s time, it now appears the greater 
danger of political corruption may have shifted from the states to the 
federation, with Congress serving as a new “Parliament” where elites can 
capture the benefits of monopoly power. Where better than Washington, 
as interest groups decide where to allocate their scare lobbying resources, 
to capture public resources and divert them to private benefit? In sum, 
while Madison’s conception of federalism was rooted in his underlying 
theory of political psychology, grounded in unchanging characteristics of 
human nature, he applied that theory to the primary threat to liberty in his 
day, a particular set of dangers of his time and place in history. This 
insight should inform how we apply Madison’s intuitions to practical 
politics today. 
But Madison’s is not the last word on federalism. A constitutional 
basis for the permanent existence of the states as separate political 
communities is, of course, rooted in the constitutional text.15 But with 
time, U.S. federalism has also been theorized in terms of values that 
transcend the Madisonian conception, some relating to the intrinsic value 
of pluralism and others to the instrumental benefits of pluralism in 
furthering democracy and increasing efficiency.16 While Madison’s 
conception primarily protects liberty, it rests on an underlying respect for 
pluralism. While Madison took it as a given that there were essential 
differences among communities that reflected their differing 
geographies, demographies and economies, these differences can also be 
viewed as valuable in their own right.17 Admittedly, the notion of state 
sovereignty as reflecting cultural distinctiveness suffered irretrievable 
harm after the Civil War and the century-long struggle to dismantle 
American apartheid in the South. Today, however, it is possible to see 
the emergence of so-called “Red” and ‘Blue” states in partisan politics as 
reflecting legitimate economic, social and cultural differences that form 
the underlying sources of political commitment. These differences today 
become worthy of protection in themselves. 
But differences are also worth protecting for instrumental reasons as 
well, relating to democracy and efficiency. If states are not empowered 
                                                                                                             
14 See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION 530-36 (1975). 
15 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3 (prohibiting changing state boundaries without 
state consent); Id. at art. V (prohibiting the denial of equal state suffrage in the U.S. 
Senate without state consent); id. at amend. 10 (confirming the existence of “reserved” 
powers in the states). 
16 See generally SAM H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM (1993). 
17 Id. at 179-80 (calling this an “argument from community”). 
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to attend to these regional differences, then they will be unable to 
construct the governance alternatives that best fit their own people’s 
needs. In addition, as the capacity of states to diverge from national 
standards diminishes, state citizens’ disaffection and exit from local 
political processes will increase, thereby reducing citizen engagement in 
community life and the education in self-government that local 
participation in self-government facilitates.18 Also, much like the need 
for biological diversity in an ecosystem, diversity in state approaches to 
complex governance problems, such as health care, can provide precisely 
the information necessary to determine how to respond to changing 
social and technological conditions at precisely the moment when the 
only certainties are change and the need to adapt to change. 
This last thought suggests why the pluralist rationale for federalism 
can merge into a utilitarian rationale. One side of efficiency is dynamic, a 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Indeed, the famous 
Brandeis/Stone paean to federalism takes exactly this view: “It is one of 
the happy incidents of the deferral system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”19 We 
make precisely the argument in the amicus brief that Obamacare, 
properly construed, enables the states to serve as the laboratories for 
experimentation in the development of exchanges that take into account 
the practical differences among the states that underlay their differing 
political commitments.20 This dynamic understanding of efficiency—one 
that builds into efficiency analysis the production of more information 
about real-world effects and also explores whether a set of preliminary 
institutions can provide workable vehicles for adaptation to changing 
circumstances—thus overlaps with arguments based on liberty and 
community. 
But federalism as an efficiency value can also be static, meaning at 
any given moment whether an issue should be resolved at a state or 
federal level depends only on the net utility of the choice. Understood as 
a form of social engineering from a top-down perspective, efficiency in 
governmental programs will not respect the permanent boundaries of the 
states, much less their liberties and their differences from each other, 
when considerations of economic efficiency alone hold otherwise.21 
Thus, its exclusive focus on economic efficiency and market failure 
theory may explain why the approach is sometimes called “fiscal 
                                                                                                             
18 See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed., 
1969) (1835). 
19 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, dissenting). 
20 See Burwell Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 20. 
21 See BEER, supra note 16, at 294. 
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federalism.”22 Viewed this way, federalism is not unlike the European 
Union’s conception of subsidiarity,23 which was adopted nominally as a 
check on the centralizing and harmonizing tendencies of the emerging 
EU, in light of concerns that the EU was being given increased 
governance responsibilities over issues extending beyond the formation 
of a common market alone. But in the EU constitutional context, 
subsidiarity was understood, not as a structural principle allocating 
authority over governance between the EU and its Member States, but 
rather as merely “a political principle, a rule of reason.”24 In short, 
subsidiarity’s focus on the “objectives of the proposed action” and 
“reasons of scale or effects” reduces the political significance of 
subsidiarity to a utilitarian analysis, akin to the static conception of 
federalism as fiscal federalism in the American context. If this is what 
federalism means to the proponents of reading the Affordable Care Act 
to facilitate supplanting the State Exchanges with the single, universal 
federal exchange, then it would be natural for them to turn to European 
solutions that would subordinate federalism’s commitment to liberty 
(through transparent deliberation and democratic accountability) and 
pluralism (through accommodation of local differences) to its role in 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness the government. 
However, the most recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has 
rejected a proposed European turn in U.S. constitutional law. In U.S. v. 
Printz, the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal attempt to 
require states to expend their own fiscal resources on background checks 
for gun purchasers required by federal law as a condition for purchase. In 
dissent, Justice Breyer analogized to European constitutional concepts, 
including the European Union “Directives” to EU Member States that 
require the Member States to enact legislation conforming to EU 
                                                                                                             
22 See, e.g., ROBERT MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 61-89 (1958); BEER, supra note 16, at 181. 
23 Subsidiarity was initially established in EU law in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht. 
See generally Subsidiarity, WIKIPEDIA (Mar. 6, 2015, 7:45 PM), http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Subsidiarity. In the most recent formulation as EU law, Article 5(3) of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, entering into force in 2009, it provides: 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within 
its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local 
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level. 
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art. 5 (as in effect 2010). 
24 See Koen Laenarts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the 
European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 846, 893 
(1994). 
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standards.25 But Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority insisted that 
U.S. federalism had different origins from European constitutionalism 
and that the Framers had specifically rejected European constitution 
models available to them, choosing instead to mark out a uniquely 
American understanding of federalism.26 In short, as Justice Kennedy 
observed in his decisive concurring opinion in U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton: 
Federalism was our nation’s own discovery. The 
Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius 
of their idea that our citizens would have two political 
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from 
incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created 
a legal system unprecedented in form and design, 
establishing two orders of government, each with its 
own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of 
mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain 
it and are governed by it.27 
Thus, under Justice Kennedy’s neo-Madisonian synthesis, the “double 
security” remains a vehicle for recognizing and protecting state pluralism 
by acknowledging the dual “political capacities” of our people and 
simultaneously ensuring their “rights and obligations.” U.S. federalism 
does not completely ignore efficiency, but it prioritizes pluralism and 
liberty. 
Yet, this means that U.S. federalism comes at a cost, and some have 
found that cost too high. As Frances Fukuyama recently observed, the 
United States is unique among even liberal-democratic states in 
developing democratic accountability and rule of law before it developed 
                                                                                                             
25 U.S. v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 976-977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Actually, 
Breyers’s analogy to the EU “Constitution” was actually directed against precedent the 
Printz majority relied on to ban federal “commandeering” of state executives for federal 
purposes; that precedent was the Court’s holding of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992), which had declared unconstitutional so-called “legislative commandeering.” 
26 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11. 
27 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Indeed, it was not surprising that Justice Kennedy in the oral argument, 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, King v. Burwell, No. 14-114 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2015) 
(Kennedy, J.), drew attention to underlying federalism issues in the Court’s statutory 
interpretation analysis, but the trajectory of his thought on this issue should ultimately 
lead him to the conclusion that a federal solution undermining state choices not to 
establish exchanges will undercut competitive democratic political process through which 
states are held accountable for their decisions. 
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a strong state.28 In other liberal democracies and even more so elsewhere, 
strong states emerged before strong commitments to rule of law or 
democratic accountability could develop. In many cases, such as the 
People’s Republic of China (the “PRC”), the price paid was that rule of 
law and democratic accountability remain to be constructed in regimes 
where the central state remains too strong.29 Fukuyama bemoans the 
consequences of America’s historical trajectory culminating in what he 
calls a “vetocracy” dominated by courts and parties coupled with as 
relatively weak and even incompetent bureaucracy30; and he fears that 
the European Union, as it becomes more like the United States, will 
experience a diminution in the quality and efficiency of its governance.31 
That said, others have seen the European Union’s “democracy deficit,” 
which purchased rule of law and a strong state at the price of democratic 
accountability, as an even greater challenge to European economic, 
social and political integration.32 
At this point, it is fair to acknowledge that reasonable comparative 
constitutionalists could disagree whether the EU’s single-value, entirely 
efficiency-driven understanding of subsidiarity is preferable to the U.S.’s 
multi-value federalism. Indeed, if Fukuyama is correct, how the United 
States resolves it simultaneous failure to control healthcare costs and 
meet the needs of all its people for quality healthcare may well be a test 
case for the ability of our political system to meet the challenges it faces. 
But perhaps the need for efficiency can be understood in a way that does 
take into account the need for liberty and community. In their famous 
“laboratories of democracy” dissent, Justices Brandeis and Stone added: 
The economic and social sciences are largely uncharted 
seas. We have been none too successful in the modest 
essays in economic control already entered upon. The 
new proposal involves a vast extension of the area of 
control. Merely to acquire the knowledge essential as a 
basis for the exercise of this multitude of judgments 
would be a formidable task; and each of the thousands of 
these judgments would call for some measure of 
prophecy. Even more serious are the obstacles to success 
inherent in the demands which execution of the project 
                                                                                                             
28 See FRANCES FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 472 (2014). 
29 Id. at 335-37. 
30 Id. at 488-489. 
31 Id. at 501-502. 
32 For the locus classicus of this concern, see Joseph Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust, 
61 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (1986). 
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would make upon human intelligence and upon the 
character of men. Man is weak and his judgment is at 
best fallible.33 
In short, the “laboratory” is not just a scientific laboratory of trial-and-
error in the pursuit of some universal truth; rather, it embodies 
recognition of the limits of human reason and of even the best-
intentioned politician’s capacity to understand the dangers of 
overreaching. If one wanted, for those who insist, to put this cautionary 
message in economic terms, one might analogize to the premature 
standardization phenomenon, most famously illustrated by the adoption 
of the QWERTY keyboard when other, more rational keyboard 
arrangements would soon be available.34 Along these lines, even if a 
national approach were ultimately necessary, the argument that 
“Obamacare” was only the nationalization of Massachusetts’ 
“Romneycare” could be viewed as a textbook example of the premature 
adoption of a “standard” before enough data are in to make an informed 
judgment whether that standard really is the best one available. And, if 
Fukuyama is right, an effort to implement so massive a project at the 
federal level is doomed to failure given the current weaknesses in the 
administrative capacity of the American state to perform even its most 
basic functions. Political prudence and the economic theory about the 
development of institutions would both warrant self-restraint in federal 
policymaking. Federalism’s virtues would then serve as a salubrious 
tonic for the symptoms Madison foresaw as inevitable consequences of 
faction,35 which sometimes even appear as ambition’s tendency to cloak 
its intentions in a veneer of altruism. 
A FEDERALIST SOLUTION TO CRONY HEALTHCARE CAPITALISM 
As Brill’s book reveals, the process that resulted in the adoption of 
Obamacare can only charitably be described as crony capitalism. Efforts 
at cost containment were subordinated to political expediency. For 
example, lawyers’ lobbies blocked tort reform36; labor unions blocked 
decoupling the provision of insurance from employment (thereby 
preventing increased American business competitive and increased labor 
mobility for workers no longer tied as serfs to bad jobs for good 
                                                                                                             
33 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932). 
34 See generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. 
& ECON. 1 (1990). 
35 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 119-20 (James Madison) (Leslie B. Adams ed., 
1983). 
36 See AMERICA’S BITTER PILL, supra note 4, at 158. 
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healthcare insurance)37; big pharmaceutical companies obtained further 
rights to monopoly protection for so-called “biologics” that were not 
previously patentable38; big pharmaceutical companies also blocked 
parallel trade reform that might have made at least some Canadian-
produced, low-cost drugs available for import,39 thus failing to seize an 
opportunity to initiate a rational national conversation concerning the 
tradeoff between current consumption and incentives for future 
production and exacerbating the risk of the emergence of black markets 
with accompanying reduced respect for law; hospitals, benefiting from a 
wave of mergers that increased their market power, managed to nix 
efforts to increase antitrust enforcement to restore a more competitive 
market.40 Further, the federal government forewent an opportunity to use 
its market power as a buyer of Medicare health services to drive down 
prices.41 
Meanwhile, as Brill argues, the insurance companies—the only 
players in the system with an incentive to encourage cost control, and 
whose profit rates were well below those of the pharmaceutical 
companies and hospitals, including the so-called “nonprofit” 
hospitals42—were vilified by politicians seeking scapegoats for the ills 
that required health care reform.43 Finally, the legislation ignored the 
effects on doctors, whose share of healthcare revenues have declined 
year-by-year, and who may be soon in undersupply for many consumers 
as doctors exit the profession or transform their business models to serve 
elites in so-called “concierge” practices.44 Thus, as Brill’s masterful 
                                                                                                             
37 Id. at 30-31 (discussing potential labor union opposition to taxation of employer-
provided insurance as a possible element of “Romneycare” in Massachusetts); id. at 113 
(same opposition in Obamacare). 
38 Id. at 132-34. 
39 Id. at 97, 125-27. 
40 Id. at 138-39. 
41 Id. at 97. 
42 Id. at 101-03. 
43 Id. at 107-109 (detailing the challenges the insurance industry faced in making all 
the projections necessary to determine the premium levels that could match anticipated 
costs under the range of new proposals); id. at 142-44 (describing the politically-
opportunistic “targeting” of the insurance industry to win support for reform). 
44 Id. at 154-55 (describing the relative weakness of the doctors’ lobbying influence in 
the legislative process); id. at 411 (describing the relatively small gains of doctors 
compared to those of hospital administrators from the proceeds from Obamacare’s 
expansion of health care outlays); Concierge Medicine, WIKIPEDIA (Dec. 21, 2014, 
10:23 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceirge_medicine (“The 22% increase in 
office visits, the shortage of doctors and the increased paperwork requirements will 
increase the demand for concierge medicine. Patients want guaranteed service and 
doctors do not want to deal with the overwhelming paperwork of insurance paid 
medicine.”) (citing William Martinez, MD, MS & Thomas H. Gallagher, MD, Ethical 
Concierge Medicine?, 15 VISUAL MENTOR 576 (2013)). 
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account reveals, everybody with an interest in a status quo of little or no 
cost control got paid off in the legislative process; with pork that defies 
description, Harry Reid bought every Senator in the Democratic 
majority, because, rather than explore consensus-building options, he 
needed every Democrat to win a party-line vote.45 Something as big as 
health care will necessarily result in efficiency losses, backroom deals 
that pay off stakeholders and smack of the Parliamentary corruption 
against which the Founders rebelled. But, notwithstanding Brill’s own 
opinion that these payoffs were worth it,46 his factual account makes 
clear these losses were simply so grotesque that the average American, in 
the words of Senator Olympia Snowe, would be “disgusted.”47 
And Brill’s story gets worse. Describing Obamacare’s 
implementation, Brill reports a process that predictably devolved into a 
deadly combination of arrogance and ignorance. Regulators, deferring to 
political signals, delayed implementing the provisions that imposed the 
apparent costs of Obamacare until after elections, to permit politicians to 
avoid the discipline their factions would in due course suffer in the 
political marketplace of ideas.48 Federal administrators began to design 
the federal exchange incompetently, when they could have learned from 
states that were developing alternative procedures that turned out to be 
workable and consumer-friendly.49 Indeed, if federal regulators had 
followed the market-savvy insights of our Brandeisian “laboratories of 
democracy,” they could have reduced the loss of public trust that 
followed the incompetent initiation of the federal exchange’s website,50 
not to mention the loss of public trust when insurance policies were 
eliminated—under restrictive rules issued by federal regulators without 
regard to local variation in circumstances—when President Obama had 
promised they would remain in effect.51 
It should now be apparent why federalism, as a structural feature of 
American exceptionalism, must provide the foundational premise for the 
Court’s reasoning in King v. Burwell. In its proposal, the Senate 
recognized that our constitutional and political traditions do not admit an 
approach that focuses only on uniformity and efficiency in the national 
                                                                                                             
45 Id. at 174-79 (describing the “Cornhusker Kickback” and the “Louisiana Purchase,” 
among other legislative payoffs deemed necessary to secure a party-line vote in favor of 
Obamacare). 
46 Id. at 411-12. 
47 Id. at 178. 
48 See id. at 241. 
49 See id. at 266-69. 
50 See generally id. at 325-42. 
51 See id. at 126, 206-07 (citing President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at 
the Annual Conference of the American Medical Association (June 15, 2009)). 
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healthcare economy. Most obviously, to try to do so would entail trying 
to achieve the impossible. Our basic inability to make the super-value 
judgments that the economic efficiency criterion requires counsels 
caution in identifying one-size-fits-all solutions at the federal level. Just 
consider the inter-temporal transfers between generations in light of 
competing views of family structure that are implicit in Medicare reform; 
the marginal utility gains for the poor and middle class relative to the 
smaller marginal utility losses for the more wealthy implicit in Medicaid 
reform; and the libertarian and paternalist conflict in configuring 
consumer participation on whether to use mandates or rely instead on 
behavioral economic analysis to construct opt-out regulations. Finally, 
welfare analyses that focus only on efficiency in a pecuniary sense do not 
account for the non-quantifiable values that must be addressed by 
democratic accountability through electoral processes and rule of law 
compliance by courts and administrative procedures. And they certainly 
don’t account for regional variation. Interpreting the Affordable Care Act 
to facilitate a single federal solution to all these questions ignores our 
history and traditions. 
But perhaps more important, surely for a deliberative democracy in a 
federal system, how we get to “yes” in healthcare reform is at least as 
important as whether we succeed.52 Indeed, as Edmund Burke believed, 
“knowledge is not held individually but collectively—in institutions, 
customs, and even shared prejudices. Maintaining a population’s 
allegiance to and trust in such institutions is a more important goal than 
promoting efficiency or rationality.”53 Accordingly, the failure of thirty-
five states to create exchanges compels the conclusion that when the 
federation asked a question, the states answered in the negative, at least 
for now. Like the compulsory expansion of Medicaid the Court rightly 
ruled constitutionally coercive in in NFIB v. Sebelius,54 the extension of 
the subsidy to the federal exchange would, in effect, constitute an 
expansion of federal power that is inconsistent with the replacement of 
the single-federal exchange contemplated by the House bill with the 
state-based approach of the Senate bill.55 The statutory subsidy for only 
State Exchanges, rather than also for the federal exchange, is precisely 
                                                                                                             
52 Cf. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (providing a roadmap for principled negotiating strategies 
that maintain the relationship between parties to a bargain). 
53 Iain Hampsher-Monk, How to Think Like Edmund Burke: Debating the 
Philosopher’s Complex Legacy 94 FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2015), available at http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/142487/iain-hampsher-monk/how-to-think-like-edmund-burke 
(reviewing DAVID BROMWICH, HOW TO THINK LIKE EDMUND BURKE (2014)). 
54 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-08 (2012). 
55 See supra text accompanying notes 4–7. 
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the kind of carrot for state participation that preserves the proper 
relationship between the federation and the states. But if federal 
exchanges were exact counterparts of State Exchanges with equal federal 
support through subsidies to consumers, the states would be compelled to 
create their own exchanges or cede control of the policy space now 
occupied by the Federal healthcare exchange. The Senate’s vision of a 
consensual and decentralized scheme could in due course be replaced by 
a wholly federalized system that could in turn morph into a European-
style single-payer system. Thus, if the federal option supplanted the 
states, it would distort the operation of federalism at precisely the 
moment when federalism’s simultaneous promotion of diversity, 
efficiency and democracy would best serve the nation, enabling the 
political system to give more refined consideration to the range of 
Pandora’s Box issues that the enactment of Obamacare opened. 
Healthcare federalism, ideally, would promote liberty-enhancing 
recognition of regional diversity, the welfare-enhancing promotion of 
learning from the benefits of state diversity and the democracy-
reinforcing effect of encouraging the peoples of the states and the 
federation to learn, reconsider and debate the important choices buried in 
the Affordable Care Act. Surely, in the spirit of Justices Brandeis’ and 
Stone’s humility, much can be learned from the crony-capitalist path by 
which Obamacare was enacted; and, in the aftermath of a decision by the 
Supreme Court empowering the states, much will be learned from the 
different options that will emerge as the Federal Government considers 
whether to re-tool its exchange and, as evidence becomes available from 
the experience of other states, the states themselves reconsider their 
earlier decisions not to establish exchanges. Indeed, citizen consumers, 
now without subsidies for their participation in the federal exchange, 
may even pressure some of the state governments to reconsider their 
initial decisions not to establish exchanges—thus fulfilling the federalist 
design of a properly interpreted Affordable Care Act. But, most 
important, regardless of whether states reconsider their initial decisions, 
as Brandeis and Stone understood, federalism is a check against hubris. 
And if the Supreme Court doesn’t respect the words Congress enacted as 
law, and thereby hold the federal political system to account for the 
careless, secretive and even corrupt processes that yielded the Affordable 
Case Act, then we should not be surprised to continue to see federal 
crony capitalism running riot. 
